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ABSTRACT
A BID-RENT MODEL OF URBAN
RESIDENTIAL LOCATION
by
Arthur William Putzel
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies.and Planning
on May 9, 1975 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Science.
A bid-rent model of residential allocation is formulated
on the basis of treating housing as a hedonic good and in-
corporating this into Alonso's theory of the urban land
market. Utility functions for housing and "non-locational
expenditures" are estimated. A simulation model of the
Boston SMSA housing market is built. The model is made
operational and the results of a simulation run are com-
pared to the actual location pattern to determine the reli-
ability of the model, as well as used to provide a basis
of comparison for subsequent runs.
In four policy runs, various alterations are made in the
supply and demand characteristics of the model. Two runs
make alterations in the supply--one adds low-income housing
in the suburbs, while the other renovates the downtown area.
The first of the demand runs examines the effects of a
percent-of-rent transfer payment, while the second looks
at a straight income transfer to low-income groups. Impli-
cations for both policy and the model are discussed. Con-
clusions detail possible uses of the model, its reliability
in its present form, and'recommendations for future im-
provements.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Assistant Professor of Economics and Urban Studies
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Introduction
Life in a metropolitan area is a blend of an imposing
number of urban activities. Yet one of these activities
manages to be responsible for the overwhelming majority of
the land use in that area. This activity is housing. It is
one of the few activities (or products) in which everyone,
in one way or another, participates. In general, consump-
tion of housing services accounts for about 20 percent of
a household's budget. Yet we still know very little about
how the housing decision is made, that is, what causes peo-
ple to live where they do.
The narrowing of this knowledge gap is one of the prime
aims of this dissertation. A solid, internally consistent
theory of the urban housing and location decision has been
operationalized in an effort to test the theoretical speci-
fication against the reality. If we can begin to understand
the nature and magnitudes of the various inputs to the hous-
ing decision, then we can hope to influence these choices
in desirable directions. Some policies have been simulated;
not only do they give us information as to their effects on
the urban pattern, but they also provide feedback on the
modelling process, allowing the model maker to revise his
tools. This exercise has three goals, then: to develop a
Itheory of the urban residential location process, to test
the applicability of this theory in the real world, and
finally to test frequently-encountered urban policies in
this newly-developed laboratory.
In accordance with these goals, this paper has been
divided into five parts: (1) an explanation of the theory
and the model, (2) and (3) the fitting of the model to the
residential situation in the Boston SMSA, and (4) and (5)
tests of various policies. Hopefully, this research has
initiated the development of a fruitful branch of investi-
gation and a powerful planning tool.
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THE THEORY OF HOUSING AND ITS APPLICATION
We have already established the need for studying the
behavior of the housing market in the urban situation. How-
ever, we have also implied that there is something unique
about the housing market that differentiates it from other
markets. Why can we not study it as we would a market for
cars, or even more difficult, why is it different from the
other urban location markets, such as the markets for commer-
cial and industrial space? Answering these questions should
give us some important clues as to how our model should be
handled.
The bulk of our answer lies in two major factors - the
durability of housing and its heterogeneous nature. Housing
is a unique good - the overwhelming majority of the popula-
tion owns or rents only one housing unit, and almost none
have more than one unit in the same urban area. Therefore,
the choice of a housing unit takes on an added importance
in the present period. Housing lasts considerably more than
one period, however. In fact, it is the most durable of all
consumer goods. The consumption decision in one period can
influence the consumption decision for years to come, in
that the costs of rectifying a wrong decision (or even one
that has become less practical over time) can be very great.
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Also, one household's consumption decision can influence
another's, in that the secondary market in the good provides
most of the market activity, so that the characteristics of
the housing unit are determined by the tastes of the initial
occupant of that unit.
Much more important as a differentiator of the housing
market is the heterogeneous nature of the good. In commer-
cial and industrial location theory, the location decision
can generally be reduced to one of maximizing expected
profitability, generally measured in commonly accepted
monetary terms. Expected market size, costs of providing
a work force, costs of land, transportation costs, and all
the rest of the inputs to a rational industrial location
decision can be collapsed into the one-dimensional world
of dollars and cents. Households are not in business;
their decisions cannot be collapsed into decisions of pro-
fitability. Thus arose the definition and treatment of
housing as a hedonic good, that is, one that gives pleasure.
Housing is viewed as a composite package of goods, each of
which gives, in combination with the rest of the package,
a certain utility to the household. Our problem in anal-
yzing the housing market lies in the difficulty in measuring
the "quantity" of housing; the hedonic approach to housing
gets around this problem by measuring the amount of utility
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that a particular household may derive from that package.
There is very little meaning in the traditional concept
of price of housing versus quantity until we infuse the
"quantity" measure with its multi-dimensional nature; we
can then assume that a household will pay more for "more"
housing.
Our model of the urban housing market combines this
approach to housing with a generalization of Alonso's
approach to the urban land market. (Alonso,1964.) Alonso's
residential market involves tradeoffs among three goods-
land, distance from the center, and a composite "other good".
He postulates a utility function which relates the tradeoffs
among these goods to the amount of happiness (utility) that
the household derives from them. Using this function in
conjunction with a budget constraint and the traditional
marginality conditions, he arrives at a "bid-price" curve
which gives the bid of a household for a parcel of land
as a function of the utility level, the attributes of the
parcel, and the income of the household. Each landlord
behaves as an auctioneer, and sells his parcel to the house-
hold which bids the highest. Thus, residential parcels are
allocated to households.
We have extended Alonso's model so that it includes the
structures and the neighborhood attributes of given parcels,
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rather than the unbuilt featureless plain of his model.
(See Wheaton, 1974 for further discussion.) This implies
a much shorter time horizon than the Alonso model. In the
long run, all structures are variable, and therefore a long-
run equilibrium solution will approximate the featureless
plain, since possible buildings for any location enter into
profitability considerations. This model, then, is one of
a short-run equilibrium. Consider a vector of housing
attributes X (these may be attributes of the structure, the
lot, the neighborhood, or the location of the house within
the metropolitan area). Then we may postulate the existence
of a utility function (of as yet unspecified form) such that
UO = U(X,M) where M is the consumption of all other goods.
We may also assume that these functions are different for
each individual, in which case the above becomes
(1) Uoi = Ui (XiMi).
Furthermore, each individual is subject to a budget constraint
(2) yi = Ri+pm Mi
where y is income, R is the total expenditure on housing,
and pm and l are the price and quantity of consumption of
a composite good representing all non-locational expenditure.
If we assume pm equal to 1, we get (without loss of generality)
(3) Yi = Ri + Mi.
Finally, if we assume that Ui is invertable, we can write
(4) Mi = U71 (Uo ,xi)
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Combining (3) and (4), that is, constraining the house-
hold's utility function by its budget, we can get our basic
"bid-rent" equation, that is,
(5) Yi - Ri = U71 (Uoi, Xi), or
(6) Ri = Yi - U'l (Uo , Xi).
The intuitive appeal of this bid-rent formulation is clear.
Let us assume that one component of our housing package has
positive utility, dU/dxj>O, or in other words, an additional
amount of an attribute with positive utility will increase
the amount that a household is willing to bid for a housing
package, given a constant level of utility. This last, the
assumption of a constant level of utility across all housing
packages, is a crucial one for our model, but one that is
easily explainable in first-year economics. If we had a
number of different households, all with identical utility
functions and incomes, and yet at different utility levels,
those households at the lower utility level would be willing
to move into the houses of those at the higher level. This
would put an upward pressure on the rents of those at the
higher level, which would continue until utilities were
equalized and no one would be made better off by moving.
It should be emphasized that this applies only to households
with identical utility functions and incomes.
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The bid-rent function enables us to find a bid-rent for
each housing package for each household, given some level
of utility Uoi and income Yi. Our allocation procedure is
identical to Alonso's, in that the parcel goes to the high-
est bidder. This merely says that the landlord is maximi-
zing his profits, certainly a reasonable assumption.
Up to this point, I have alluded to the allocation
mechanism only so far as to say that the housing packages
go to the highest bidder. However, it should be readily
apparent that with arbitrarily selected levels of Uo, there
will be many households which bid successfully on more than
one house, and many which bid successfully on none. Since
we have earlier established that very few households will
command more than one housing package in reality, some sort
of adjustment mechanism is necessary. It is this mechanism
which makes the model work.
First, let me establish one very important point.
The model being described here is an equilibrium model.
Therefore, the mechanismsused to reach this equilibrium
are designed not so much as accurate representations of
real world processes as they are intuitively reasonable
means for reaching a goal. We are not claiming that every
household bids for every housing unit, nor are we claiming
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that in actuality the landlord opens a series of sealed
bids to determine his tenants; rather, we believe that
this is a reasonable abstraction of the actual processes.
Having established this, I may move on to the adjustment
processes.
After the auction as described above, each household
has been allocated a certain number of houses, either more
or less than it needs. The model compares the number allo-
cated to the number needed. If there is an excess of
houses, the utility level for that household is revised
upward (the equivalent of a downward shifting of the bid-
rent schedule), and vice versa for a deficiency. The bid-
rent calculations and.allocation are then repeated, the
entire process being rerun until demand just equals supply
for each household. Again, we must remember that this
iterative approach is a model representation. It could be
analogized to the real world by saying that people enter
the market with certain expectations about the availability
of units and the price structure and revise their expecta-
tions on the basis of new information, but the analogy has
only limited application.
A further theoretical justification of this approach
is its duality with a utility-maximization approach. In
equilibrium, the model produces an envelope of bid-rents
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which represents the actual rent gradient (it is made up
of the bid-rents of successfully bidding households).
Given this rent gradient, allowing each household to max-
imize its utility would result in exactly the same location
pattern as our model produces. This theorem is proved in
Wheaton (July, 1974); there is no reason to reproduce it
here. It is sufficient to say that the existence of this
duality makes the solution of the equilibrium much easier,
since the manipulation of n utility levels is much easier
than m prices, when m is much greater than n (which, as we
shall see later, is the case here).
I have described a method by which the existing housing
stock is allocated. Although it forms a large part of the
housing market, it is clearly not the entire market, in
that new housing should also be considered. In fact, we
have built into the model a mechanism for the development
of vacant land, one which closely parallels Alonso's model.
In our model, vacant locations are characterized only by
neighborhood characteristics, and a number of possible
housing types (of varying density) are postulated. Bid
rents are calculated for all combinations of housing types
and households for each location. That combination of
household and house type which yields the most profit per
acre is selected by the developer for development. The
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units acquired in this way also enter into the utility
adjustment calculations.
The model has been presented as one in which each
household has a separately identified utility function
and bids on a number of differentiated units. However,
even modern data-processing techniques cannot handle the
manipulation of 900,000 households and houses with any
reasonable cost. Even if it were possible, the utility
functions can only be determined by revealed preference,
and revealed preference can only be used.if there are a
number of observations on the same decision-maker. Since
we have only one observation on each household, we are forced
to aggregate households into strata, using a method to be
described in the next section. By the same token, using
data on each housing unit in the metropolitan area would
be prohibitively expensive to use, so it was necessary to
aggregate into groups of houses with common characteristics.
THE TIE MECHANISM
. The aggregation into zones of housing units necessi-
tated a mechanism for dividing up the zones among different
strata, in order to introduce some locational heterogeneity
into the model and enable it to reach equilibrium within
a reasonable amount of time. It was postulated that the
various imperfections of the market -- imperfect information,
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costs of search and movinget cetera -- make getting the
absolute maximum possible rent on any given unit very un-
likely. Therefore, we introduced a tie range into the
model; that is, any stratum that bid within Tl of the max-
imum bid on a housing unit, or offered a profit per acre
within T2 of the maximum, was considered to have been
successful in the auction. The zone was then divided
equally among all successful bidders. Larger tie ranges
imply greater market imperfections, and result in more
diversified housing patterns.
RESERVATION PRICES
In a bid-rent model where the number of available
units just equals the number of households, relative rents
will be determined but the absolute level will be indeter-
minate. In our model, the number of units generally exceeds
the number of households, meaning that in equilibrium, some
of the units must be vacant. This was incorporated by
setting a market reservation price for built-up units and
one for vacant land. If the maximum bid for a unit is
below this price, it is presumed that the rent cannot cover
the variable costs of renting the unit, and it will be held
off the market. This gives us a numeraire, as the margin-
ally rented unit will rent for just above the reservation
price. Without such a reservation price to vary the supply,
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the model as constructed could never reach equilibrium.
UTILITY ADJUSTIMENT MECHANISM
In our formulation of the utility function, we made the
explicit assumption that the utility function is separable.
This means that the term U~ (UoiX) may be broken into
f(Uo )*g(X), that is, the rent structure can be varied by
varying only f(Uoi) while all other terms remain constant
over all iterations.
in terms of the cost
mechanism is tied to
and excess demand in
exceeds total demand
is too high relative
adjustment mechanism
the rent structure.
units than it needs,
This had very important implications
of running the model. The adjustment
both excess demand within the strata
the market as a whole. If total supply
, it indicates that the rent structure
to the reservation price, and the
raises all utilities, thus lowering
If a particular stratum commands more
its bid-rent curve is too high com-
pared to other strata, and its utility is raised. This
mechanism tends to drive the market to equilibrium. Al-
though we have been unable to develop a theoretical proof
that the process will reach equilibrium, the model has gen-
erally tended to converge (within the limits imposed by
the imperfect divisibility of the model) within 100 iter-
ations.
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ASSUIPTIONS
Our specification of an urban residential location
model contains a number of important assumptions, both
implicit and explicit. In order to fully understand and
be able to use the output of such a model, we must be well
grounded in its theoretical underpinning. This section
of the paper is designed to present some of the assumptions
and analyze their implications for the results.
A. Perhaps most important is our supposition that a
given population can be stratified by its socio-economic
characteristics into a manageable number of groups, that
the resulting agglomerations of people will have very sim-
ilar preference structures within the group, and that differ-
ent groups will exhibit very dissimilar behavior. This pre-
sumption allows us to estimate the utility functions, for,
as mentioned above, we need many observations on behavior
of the same household before we can specify its preference
function. If our assumption is not valid, that is, is
socio-economic variables are not important in determining
behavior, then our estimates of the utility functions will
be the same for all strata, and should differ only by a
stochastic term. It was noted earlier that the bid-rent
solution is the dual of the utility-maximization solution.
Estimation of the bid-rent functions assumes that each rent
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lies on the bid-rent curve of the strata located there,
and furthermore that any two zones in which a strata is
located lie on the same bid-rent (or indifference) curve.
These must be utility-maximizing points; otherwise the re-
vealed preferences are not truly preferences.
B. Second, and a rather trivial assumption in theory
but one that may be often violated in reality, is the fact
that the model constrains identical units to rent for the
same price. This applies only to units where each of the
xj has the same value; it does not mean that two units
which have the same utility (and thus the same bid-rent)
for stratum 1 will have the same utility and rent for stra-
tum 2. In fact, the existence of geographically and infor-
mationally segregated submarkets may allow differences in
rent to exist.
C. Thr-oughout the early part of this paper, I have
implied that all households make bids on all units. This
argues for perfect information on both the part of the
household, in knowing what units are available, and the
landlord, in that there is no element of risk that a better
offer will come along. The need for this assumption is
partially mitigated by the tie mechanism, which provides
a range of acceptable bids. This does not necessarily
define the proper submarkets, however, in that a house-
11-14
hold's search may be limited by geographical area or other
non-random influence; the need for perfect information,
then, might somewhat bias the model.
D. Preference structures, or utility functions, once
estimated, are assumed to be relatively constant through
time. Especially if we maintain that the market is tend-
ing towards an equilibrium, this assumption is necessary,
as it needs a constant goal to tend toward. As we have
formulated the vacant land mechanism, this assumption
greatly eases computation, since it is assumed that the
profit-maximizing solution in period 1 will be the profit-
maximizing solution in all periods to come. Were preference
structures to change with any rapidity over time, this would
no longer be valid. Note that this does not imply that a
particular household may not change its preferences as its
situation in the life-cycle changes, but rather that a
family at a certain position in the life cycle in period 1
will have the same preferences as a different family at
the same point in the life cycle in period N.
E. This is a residential allocation model. As such,
the location of industrial and commercial activity, even
population-serving commercial activity, is presumed to be
independent of the pattern of residential location. Insofar
as residential and population-serving retail location are
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interdependent, the model will be biased in its location
patterns. However, the implicit assumption is that these
secondary effects on the location pattern are inconsequential.
F. Household utility functions include only predeter-
mined characteristics of the structure and the neighborhood.
Since the model locates all households simultaneously, con-
siderations of the makeup of the neighborhood in terms of
other households present are not important; in other words,
household location decisions are independent. This could
be removed by calculating the ethnic makeup of a given
neighborhood after each iteration and using it as an input
to the next iteration (as an item in the preference function).
However, this approach has the conceptual disadvantage of
making the final equilibrium dependent on the path used
to obtain it, which is undesirable as the iterations them-
selves have no conceptual significance.
G. A strong assumption, and one that lies at the
heart of the model, is that there does exist an equilibrium
towards which the market is tending at any one time. This
is in effect saying that the behavior of the market is
purposive rather than random. If we do not make this
assumption, our model can have no use, since the effects
of any policies we may introduce will not have predictable
results, in that the market will make no effort to reestab-
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lish equilibrium.
H. Maximum bid-rent is the sole determinant of the
successful bidder in a particular zone. In the real world,
many other factors enter - certain units require no unre-
lated individuals of opposite sexes, some require no pets,
and, most importantly, many discriminate becuuse of color.
There is no indication of this built into the model; build-
ers and landlords are motivated only by profit considera-
tions. Except for discrimination by color, which will be
discussed later, it does not appear that this will intro-
duce important discrepancies into the model.
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UTILITY FUNCTION FORMULATION AND ESTIMATION
The utility function lies at the core of our model,
since it is this function which is the major determinant
of all bid-rents, and thus the final location pattern and
rent structure. The formulation and estimation of this
function, then, is a crucial part of the modelling process
and, as it is the focus of many of our assumptions, one
that deserves to be treated at some length. This section
will be devoted to an explication of the utility function,
the data used to estimate it, and the methods and results
of estimations.
FORMULATION OF THE FUNCTION
As we have noted before, households derive utility
from both the characteristics of the housing unit in which
they locate as well as the characteristics of the neighbor-
hood. We have also stipulated in the previous section that
the function be separable, which eases the operation of the
model with no great loss in theoretical flexibility. Finally,
we shall make the fairly evident assumption that extremely
low levels of some components of housing (e.g. number of
rooms, quality of the unit, ease of transportation) entail
very severe disutilities. A function which satisfies these
characteristics, and one that is still very easy to estimate,
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is the Cobb-Douglas form,
U = Xi
This formulation has certain disadvantages, namely that
the elasticities of substitution between any two components
are all equal and unitary, but the savings over estimating
a more complex function where this is not true (e.g. a gener-
alized C. E. S. function) more than make up for this re-
striction. The estimating form of the equation was
log(Y-R) = U - ai logXi + e
which is simply
U = aUM'[ XMai
transformed for ease of estimation, with
M = Y-R all non-locational expenditure
U = level of utility
X = vector Qf neighborhood and housing attributes
a = vector of estimated coefficients
aM
Marginal rates of substitution, which provide one of the
few bases for comparing utility functions in this model,
are found to be
dXi / dXj = aiXj
a I
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An assumption of the model reported earlier is that
the market tends toward an equilibrium in the long run,
or the model would have no significance. While important,
this is in atuality a weak assumption about equilibrium.
In order to estimate the utility functions, we must make
a much stronger assumption. At any point in time, the mar-
ket is assumed to be approximately in a short-term equil-
ibrium. This is necessary to validate our estimation,
since I earlier pointed out that estimation could only be
made possible by numerous observations along the same util-
ity curve, which implies that all households must be at the
same utility level at the time of estimation. Ideally,
these estimations should have been done on the basis of
individual household data. However, such data was not
available, and census-tract level aggregations had to be
used, thus eliminating much of the richness of the data.
Problems with this technique are discussed in a following
section. The error term s in our specification is in part
designed to account for fluctuations from the equilibrium
utility level due to frictional costs in the market, such
as moving or transaction costs. This assumption about ,
and the assumption that it enters additively in the log-
linear form, are necessary for simplicity of estimation.
Assumptions about the distribution of c will be discussed
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later.
This same aggregation, while making the estimation
possible, also leads to some serious problems. Grouping
such diverse units as households into strata of identically-
behaving decision makers eliminates much of the richness and
explanatory power of the model. While we hope to have cap-
tured much of the variance in individual behavior, there
are so many influences on the housing decision that large
prediction errors on the micro-scale will be unavoidable.
All we can really hope to predict is gneral patterns. Many
of the aggregation problems were inherent in the data; these
will be discussed in the next section.
DATA AND SOURCES
The bulk of the data used in the calibration of the
model was drawn from the 1970 Census of Housing. Using
the data contained in this source, we aggregated individual
households into ninety-six household groups, or strata.
These strata were defined by two races, six median family
sizes, and eight median income levels. From this point on,
strata will be referred to by index numbers, where the first
number represents race, the second family size, and the
third income, according to the following table:
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FIRST DIGIT: SECOND DIGIT: THIRD DIGIT:
RACE SIZE INCOME
(jmedian)_
1 White 1 One person 1 $ 1,800
2 Non-white 2 Two 2 2,600
3 Three " 3 3,600
4 Four " 4 4,600
5 Five " 5 8,000
6 Six + " 6 12,500
7 20,000
8 28,000
For instance, Stratum 128 refers to white, two-person
households with median income $28,000.
The specification of the utility function included
four housing attributes and six neighborhood attributes.
The dependent variable in all regressions was taken to be
the log of median income less the mean annual value of
housing units in the tract. The latter quantity was avail-
able by income and race.
Of the structural characteristics that we used, only
one, mean age of the un;t (AGE), varied by stratum as well
as tract, being available by race and family size. This
variation, combined with the mean annual value variation,
was sufficient to allow us to independently estimate the
ninety-six strata. The other three structural variables
were ROOMS, LOTSIZE and PLUMBING. The first, ROOMS, is
111-6
the sum of the mean number of bedrooms and mean number of
bathrooms for each tract. LOTSIZE is a measure of the
average lot size per unit, calculated as the total land
devoted to residential use divided by the total number of
units in the tract. The land use data came from the data
bank created for the EMPIRIC model. Thus, our model com-
bines 1963 land use data with 1970 census data. This could
create certain problems, but the assumption was made that
as far as residential use was concerned, the 1963 data was
a good approximation. The final structural variable,
PLUMBING, is the percent of the units in the tract that
have bad plumbing, and was taken directly from the census.
Six neighborhood variables were used, representing
both the physical and fiscal quality of life. One of the
most important of these is TRAVEL COSTS, which represents
the costs of an "average" trip from the zone in question.
It represents a weighted average of activities in all other
zones. Since travel costs play such an important role in all
location theory, we would expect accessibility to be very
significant in our estimations.
Also included in the utility function are two land use
categories, which are used to represent the quality of the
neighborhood. LANDUSEl is the percentage of the total land
in the tract devoted to noxious uses, that is, industrial
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use. LANDUSE2 is similarly the percentage of land in re-
creational uses. These three variables are calculated at
various aggregation levels; travel costs being based on
BRA districts within the cities and towns outside, while
LANDUSE1 and LANDUSE2 correspond to EMPIRIC districts, which
are on a much finer scale.
The last three neighborhood variables relate to the
level of services provided by the neighborhood. They are
the pupil-teacher ratio (PUPIL RATIO), per capita expendi-
tures on crime prevention (CRIMEEXP), and the property tax
ratio (PROPTAX - defined as total poll and property tax
revenues divided by income). These variables are available
only by town, the model thereby suffering the severe mis-
fortune of having one value for all of the 156 census tracts
in the city of Boston.
This last comment leads us to a very important area,
that is, the possible breakdown of the model due not to
theoretical difficulties but to deficiencies in the data.
Such implicit assumptions as one crime prevention level
for all of Boston, or equal quality schools in Roxbury and
Hyde Park, tend to mask many of the important differences
in these areas. Within individual tracts, using the mean
characteristics may have much the same effect, in that one
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hundred two-room efficiency apartments and one hundred ten-
room houses average out to two hundred six-room units.
Neither the inhabitants of the efficiency nor those of the
house will choose the six-room unit, and the model will
therefore incorrectly predict the location pattern. We
see, then, that an implicit assumption in the model is that
the variation within census tracts as far as housing and
neighborhood characteristics is small compared with the
variation among tracts. Only as far as this expectation
is fulfilled can we expect the model to accurately repro-
duce reality.
ESTIMATION
The basis for the estimation was the 446 census tracts
of 1960 which make up the Boston Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area. Census data from 1970 was converted to
agree with the 1960 tracts in order to have agreement be-
tween census and land use data. Certain tracts were dropped
from the sample due to the unavailability of certain data
points. Furthermore, in the individual estimations, only
those tracts in which there were. more than three households
in the stratum in question were used. In the white strata,
this generally did not lead to any problems, but for the
non-white strata there were often very few such observa-
tions. Finally, of the ninety-six possible strata, only
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fifty-four were sufficiently large to allow meaningful
estimations. Of these, thirty-one were white and twenty-
three black. Complete listings of both zones and zonal
characteristics and strata and strata coefficients are
found in the Appendices.
Two major problems had to be overcome in the estima-
tions, problems that invalidated the normal least-squares
approach. The first of these is heteroscedasticity in the
error term, due to the grouping of data. The theoretical
formulation of our problem deals with the individual house-
hold, and states that
log(Yi - Ri) = U - aiXi + U.
However, our data is of the form
log(Yi-Ri) = U - ] aiXi + U.
where a bar denotes the mean. In Johnston (1963), we find
that if the variance of the dependent variable is i.i.d.
and equal to 102 in the first case, then the variance of
the dependent variable in the second case will be
E(iij') = o 2GG', where G is a grouping matrix, and (GG')-l
is an m by m matrix (m equals number of tracts) with the
number of observations on the diagonal and all off-diagonal
terms equal to zero. It can be shown that using a matrix
with the square roots of the number of observations on the
III-10
diagonal and zeros on the off-diagonals, that is,
A ,rn - 0
will reduce this error variance to a constant d 2 . There-
fore, weighting our observations by the square root of
the number of households of that particular stratum in
the zone will eliminate the heteroscedasticity in the error
term.
The second problem is one of errors in variables. The
structural characteristics that we use in the estimations
are not the true means of the strata being estimated. For
instance, in zone i, we use the mean age of unit for large
black families as a whole for each of the strata 261, 262,...
268. This introduces a bias into the data, for if we
assume that unit age has negative utility, and that more
money therefore allows one to buy less of it, then the
true mean Xi will be consistently less than the mean for-
all of the eight strata, which is the variable that we
are using. In other words, by using these bias means, we
no longer have independence of he regressor and the error
term.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach was used to
alleviate this problem. It was assumed that if the mean
characteristics were ranked by zone, and these rankings
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grouped into three ranks (high, medium, low), then these
final rankings would be uncorrelated with the measure-
ment bias of the census means, but highly correlated with
the means themselves, thereby fulfilling the requirements
of an IV. Since IV gave more intuitively appealing re-
sults than OLSQ, the results from the former were used,
and are reported here.
RESULTS
Results of the estimations were generally quite good,
with coefficients generally having quite reasonable values,
as will be discussed later in the section. However, the
estimation did point up some ambiguities in our variables,
as well as accentuating the problems of aggregation that
were discussed earlier. For instance, our AGE variable is
presumed a priori to have negative utility, in that all
other things such as condition being equal, people will
prefer new houses to old ones. However, twenty-two of
the fifty-four strata had positive utility for age, pri-
marily among the poor and blacks. One could hypothesize
that this is not a revealed preference, but a necessity,
in that the poor are willing to live in older units in
order to afford other things. Or, artificially high rents
in poor units could be the result of market imperfections
(e.g. racial discrimination or imperfect information) that
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prevents the market from reaching a true equilibrium.
The same argument could be applied to LTSIZE, since the
estimations tell us that blacks do not like to have land.
In fact, the results of the black estimations generally
showed the effects of these imperfections, in that there
were many wrong signs. The existence of wrong signs is not
in itself justification for discarding those strata, for in
the absence of a discrimination mechanism in the model,
they may help to more accurately reproduce reality. In
fact, were we to include racial composition of the tract
as a variable, many of these wrong signs would be reversed.
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USES OF THE MODEL - THE BASE RUN
The first test of any model is its ability to repro-
duce reality. In this case, the reality which we are
attempting to recreate is the location pattern existing
in Boston at the time of the estimations. The results of
such a run would be useful in two major areas. First, they
allow us to test the reasonableness of our assumptions about
the market and equilibrium conditions. If the fit between
the model and the reality is extremely poor, there is no
reason to suspect that any policy implications that may be
drawn from it are any better. Second, the base run pro-
vides us with a reference point for future runs -- the
impacts of a policy can only be examined within the frame-
work that it was formulated. That is, we are only looking
at how much a policy changes a given situation, and in order
to do this, we need that given situation.
As mentioned in the last section, only fifty-four of
the ninety-six stratum were estimated. Similarly, not all
of the zones in the Boston area could be used due to the
unavailability of data. Ten census tracts were eliminated
for the base run, those being the Harbor Islands, Manchester,
Hamilton, two tracts in Danvers, one tract in Lexington,
Ashland, Duxbury, and two tracts in Chelsea. Even with
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these eliminations, however, there would still be many
more housing units than households. Rather than selectively
eliminating housing units, it was decided that the least
distorting method of adjusting the model would be to in-
crease all stratum sizes by six percent. This had the
effect of leaving only about one percent of the stock
vacant at equilibrium, rather than the seven percent that
would occur otherwise. Strata were thus forced to live in
undesirable central-city tracts as well as more desirable
suburban ones, and any policy that we might try would have
more visible effects.
The only parameters of the model that affect the final
equilibrium, and thus are worth reporting here, are the
reservation price and the tie range. As the reservation
price, we chose a figure in the neighborhood of the minimum
mean annual value for any of our tracts. There was a
cluster of tracts in the $900 per year range, so we chose
this as the figure below which units would go vacant. The
tie range is a much more nebulous idea, in that a repre-
sentative figure is not so easily available. We found that
a tie range of $40, which works out to only $3.33 per
month, had good convergence properties, while still being
small enough that landlords would be able to discriminate
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between moderately differing bids. Both the reservation
price and tie range were kept constant throughout all the
policy runs in order to have a basis for comparison.
OPERATION OF THE MODEL
A word about the feasibility of using this model is
appropriate before a discussion of the results. As yet,
we have no theoretical proof that such a large and complex
model will converge to a stable supply-demand equilibrium.
However, in the many runs that were done, this model showed
very good convergence properties. In general, given a
reasonable set of initial utilities (the solution of the
base run was used as a starting point for the policy runs)
the model converged to near-equilibrium (lumpiness prevents
perfect equilibrium in this case) within two or three runs
of forty to fifty iterations each. Without the vacant land
mechanism included, fifty iterations generally took 25 to
40 seconds of machine time, the cost of a run (given that
compilation was done beforehand) being in the neighborhood
of ten dollars. It is far from being an expensive planning
tool, then, except for any expenses that are incurred in
the data collection and estimation.
RESULTS OF THE BASE RUN
The results of the base run are not perfect, but they
are good enough to impart some validity to the form and
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operation of the model. The fit was very good on the
macro scale. The total number of households in the model
was 838053; the model allocated 838214 houses to these
households, allowing 9181 to go vacant. Given sufficient
time, the allocation procedure probably could have gotten
an even closer fit, but experience shows that the location
and rent patterns would only be minutely changed. As far
as individual strata were concerned, the model varies in
its capability to handle them efficiently. For large strata,
such as 111 (46336 households) or 125 (48072 households),
the lumpiness of the model is not a problem. In fact, the
model allocations of 46437 and 47645 houses represent only
.2 and .8 percent errors respectively. However, for the
smaller, generally black, strata, there are much larger
errors. For instance, stratum 243 (939 households) was
allocated 1554 units, while 265 (1227 households) was allo-
cated 778 units. The explanation for this phenomenon is
rather simple, yet its remedy is rather obscure. Most of
the zones in this model have upwards of one or two thousand
units in them. Therefore, if a black stratum is only
slightly short of having enough houses, and revises its
utilities only enough to capture part of one extra zone,
this still may result in the addition of five hundred or so
houses, which would mean excess supply of 50%, while it
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would mean only a few tenths of one percent for a stratum
such as 111. However, without dramatically increasing
the costs of the model by increasing the number and thereby
decreasing the size of zones, it is difficult to see how
this problem can be averted.
The location pattern defined by the model is quite
reasonable and gives a fair reflection of reality, again
within the severe limitations imposed by the aggregation
both in the estimation and simulation. Five zones, repre-
senting 6260 units, went completely vacant, while eight
other zones (2921 units) went partially vacant (that is,
the maximum rent was between $860 and $940). The vacant
zones were all in what would be termed central Boston --
one in the Central Business District (a negligible number
of units), one in the South End, two in the Huntington
Avenue-Symphony Hall area, and one in the Massachusetts
Avenue-Harrison Avenue part of Roxbury (to be specific,
zones 25, 32, 44, 45, and 57). All of these zones were
characterized by a very small mean number of rooms, small
mean lot size, and a high percentage of bad plumbing.
When comparing these results with the existing reality,
it is important to remember that a good area and a poor
area are represented in the model as a mediocre area, and
that we therefore might not find that which we expect.
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Partially vacant areas tend to show the same characteris-
tics, zones 54 and 56 flanking zone 57 in Roxbury, while
29 (200 units) represents the area around the financial
district. Three of the partially vacant zones -- 11
(adjacent to Logan Airport), 58 (industrial part of South
Boston), and 432 (Chelsea) -- all have both poor plumbing
(indicating a general deterioration of the housing stock)
and a high percentage of land in a noxious category. The
two partially vacant districts in Lynn (194, 195) are simi-
lar to the former in their small rooms and low lotsize
averages.
Before proceeding with the locational analysis, it
is necessary first to issue some sweeping generalities.
The most important is that overall, the more representative
the averages are of the entire zone, the more likely it is
that the model will reproduce reality. It is this fact of
life which injected some large discrepancies into our model.
In the data set used for this model, the neighborhood
characteristics dealing with governmental functions (speci-
fically CRIMEEXP, PUPIL RATIO, and PROPTAX) were available
only by city or town. In this matter, the city of Boston
is treated as a single entity, and we have only one number
for each variable, and that number is the same for all of
Boston's 156 census tracts. While this may have introduced
some bias into the estimations, it seems to be much more
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important when trying to determine.the locational pattern
of groups within the city. To a certain extent, this
problem affects many of the other cities and towns, partic-
ularly Cambridge (30 tracts), Lynn (19 tracts), and Quincy
(11 tracts). Even for towns with only one tract, if the
town is large and the actual pattern of expenditures is
variable, there will be quite a discrepancy. Again, it is
simply a question of how the variances within zones compare
to the variances among zones.
When we separate the two largest towns, Boston and
Cambridge, from the rest of the SMSA, we find strong evi-
dence for the above argument. The base run was compared
to the actuality by obtaining a listing of the ten most
heavily represented strata in each zone, and then seeing
how well the model predicted these strata. In general,
the model does better in the non-Boston-Cambridge (herein
referred to as non-central) zones than it does in the cen-
tral zones. Of the most populous stratum in each zone,
the model successfully predicts their presence in 33 of the
185 central zones, and 83 of the 251 non-central zones, or
17.8% and 33.1%. For predicting either the first of the
second most populous strata, the figures are 25.9% for the
central and 46.6% for the non-central. Finally, the per-
centage of zones in which the model predicted none of the
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top five strata was 48.6% for the central and 34.2% for
the non-central. This is significant only in that it
points up the difficulties inherent in using greatly aggre-
gated data and trying to predict fairly disaggregate behavior
from it.
Perhaps the best way to examine the fit with reality
is to look at specific areas, see how well the model pre-
dicts the actual location pattern, and attempt to understand
why it does or does not agree. A good place to start is
with East Boston, which is represented by zones 1-12. Here
wehave a good fit in zones 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8, and a rather
poor fit in the others. One reason for the poor agreement
is that the model places large numbers of blacks, speci-
fically strata 211, 223, 224, 234, and 264 (that is, fairly
low income blacks) in this area, particularly in those areas
that are high in noxious land use due to the presence of
various Massport facilities. It is not unreasonable to
suspent that, given a simultaneous relocation of all house-
holds in the metropolitan area, East Boston might well be-
come a black ghetto, if our measurement of the utility
parameters may be believed. If we look at East Boston as
a whole, we see that the model predicted strata 125, 135,
and 145 in fairly large numbers and, while they might not
agree on the zonal level, there are certainly large numbers
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of these household types in the general area. This leads
toward the conclusion that aside from questions of race,
which will be discussed later, the model does a good job
of predicting location on a multiple-tract level.
In South Boston, another area interesting to look at
because of its easy physical definition, we find similar
behavior. In this case, I would say that we got a reason-
able fit in nine of the twelve tracts. On the area level,
the fit was very good -- in reality, the most predominant
strata in this area are 111, 112, 114, 125, 126, 136, and
others of similar size and income range. The model pre-
dicts a majority of the households will be 111, 115, 125
and 126. The worst fit of any zone in South Boston is
zone 60, for which the model predicts five household types,
none of whom are in the top ten in actuality. It is not
clear exactly what causes this, but the very low age vari-
,able for this zone leads me to suspect that there is a
low-income housing project in that area, which would bias
the income range of the residents downward from what the
equilibrium solution would predict.
Some areas, even those within the central area, are
predicted very well by the model. For instance, an area in
North Dorchester, defined as zones 72-74, 77, and 92-96,
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fits well in all but one zone. It is especially interesting
in that both the real and predicted situations are mixes of
low-income (111) and higher income, larger (135, 136, 145,
146) strata. In fact, in four of these nine zones, the
model predicts the most populous stratum, a most impressive
average.
As mentioned earlier, the model tends to predict better
in the smaller, richer (and perhaps more homogeneous?)
suburbs. For instance, in the ten zones (372-381) that
make up the towns of Needham, Dedham, Westwood and Dover,
the model predicts the first or second most po.pulous stratum
in eight of them. In Weston, the model predicts three of
the top four strata, and does not put any strata into the
zone which are not there in reality. This last is an impor-
tant point. Through any number of processes or random occur-
rences, many strata may decide to locate in a particular
zone, whether or not it is an equilibrium solution. However,
one would think that if a stratum elects not to locate in
a particular zone, that zone is dominated by other choices.
In such a situation, our model should also not locate that
stratum in that zone. It is understandbale why it fails this
test in many places, such as in Dedham, where it locates
strata 123 and 124 in two zones each, while in reality they
are in the top ten in only one zone each. Due to the uni-
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formity of the neighborhood variables over the town, it is
difficult to differentiate one Dedham zone from another.
Since travel costs are also figured by town, we lose 40%
of the variability when we get down to the tract level,
and maybe even more in terms of explanatory power.
A WORD ABOUT RENTS
Up to this point, I have discussed almost entirely
locational patterns produced by that model. Let me depart
for a while from my locational wanderings and interject a
brief word about rents. For each zone in the model, the
maximum bid-rent, which is in terms of an equivalent annual
rent, is output. When I compare these rents to the mean
rents for the zones in the real world, I am surprised to
find that in many areas the fit is very good, and in some
it is absolutely incredible.
First, two generalizations:
1) The model predicts the rent structure better
in rich communities than in poor communities.
2) The model predicts rents better outside of
Boston than within Boston.
Now, let me try to support these sweeping generalizations
with facts. The Table on the following page, which details
rents for the twelve highest-rent zones in the real world,
is bupportive of the first statement. We see that the zones
which are ranked 1, 2, 3 in the real world are ranked 3, 1, 2
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BASE RUN RENTS
ACTUAL RENT
$ 6516,93
6177.19
5628.49
5544.72
5516.52
5338.92
5270.63
5254.16
5195.45
4777.69
4538.99
4157.28
ACTUAL RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
MODEL RENT
$ 4308.49
5413.56
4391.00
3890.27
3635.09
4302.16
3614.28
3997.18
3946.38
4018.73
4121.74
3723.57
MODEL RANK
3
1
2
9
12
4
13
7
8
6
5
11
ZONE
343
381
366
230
306
322
341
325
369
354
326
392
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by the model, an amazingly close correspondence given the
major assumptions inherent in this model. We also see that
the twelve stratum are among the thirteen highest in the
model, although the one-to-one correspondence of rank order
is not quite as good. On the other side of the coin, we
have the low rent zones, those overage, rundown hovels
which offend the sensibilities of all strata. Of the top
thirteen lowest-renting zones in reality (all but one of
which are in Boston), the model predicts exactly none.
But wait, one says, could this not be due to the fact that
the data for Boston is very aggregate, and that what we are
showing here is actually a result of the second assumption?
To test this, I looked at the lowest-renting non-Boston
zones. Of the top ten of these, the model predicts only
five. We see, then, that the model predicts the richer
rents much better than the poorer ones. We also see that
the second assumption is true, since within Boston the model
has difficulty predicting relative rent levels even among
the richer zones.
There are some areas that were predicted so well that
they deserve special mention here, whether to vindicate the
model or just to show something positive. For instance,
zones 380-386 are shown on the following page.
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ZONE ACTUAL RENT MODEL RENT
380 S 3627.13 $ 3607.05
381 6177.19 5413.56
382 3394.15 3599.45
383 2464.15 2497.29
384 2676.56 2678.99
385 2449.25 2393.70
386 2111.46 2112.87
There is no clear pattern that indicates why these
particular towns should fit so well, however, so I shall
have to stick with my original conclusions. Not much more
can be said about the rent pattern; clearly, the reserva-
tion price has much to db with both the level of rents and
the relations thereof, and since it was arbitrarily chosen,
there is little to be gained from extracting further con-
clusions.
In summary, though, one would have to say that the
response of the model to reality is quite good. On the tract
level there is considerable discrepancy, but on the town
or BRA district level, it does quite well. Many of the
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difficulties are with the data, and could be resolved
without violating the integrity of the model framework.
It certainly fits well enough that we can trust it to
correctly indicate the direction and relative magnitude
of the impact that various policies, either stock- or
household-oriented, might have. Before I go on to discuss
the various policy simulations, however, I believe that a
fairly detailed examination of the reasons that the model
deviates from reality is in order, for only by understanding
these can we competently analyze and understand the results
of subsequent runs.
BASE RUN VERSUS REALITY - WHY ARE THEY DIFFERENT?
As mentioned at the very start of this paper, this
model falls squarely in the realm of equilibrium models;
it makes no pretense of simulating dynamic processes. This
implies a number of basic assumptions about the nature of
the housing market, none of which are inviolably true in
the real world. The city is not at a static equilibrium;
it is a dynamic system, in which only the smallest fraction
of the potential decision-makers are in the market at any
one time, and only a somewhat larger fraction even reevaluate
their situations in any one period. The decision-maker,
when making his choice among a number of housing packages,
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is choosing so as to maximize some expected utility function
over time, since he expects to consume that housing pack-
age over a long period (this is more true in the owner mar-
ket than the rental market, since the latter is more fluid).
It is not at all clear that we can say that at any one
point in time, then, present utility is maximized by the
current consumption package. Rather, of the packages that
faced the decision-maker at some time in the past, this
package was the one that maximized his expected utility
function. For instance, a young couple with two children
might search for a five- or six-bedroom house in anticipation
of another child, when a four-bedroom house would maximize
their present utility.
However, this in itself does not present any con-
ceptual difficulties. Since we are attempting to control
for position in the lifecycle (although granted that in
the present data aggregation we are not), we could say that
the choices revealed, and.thus the utility function that
we measure, is as expected utility function over time, and
that households still act to maximize their utility or, in
our formulation, make bids such as to equalize all expected
utilities. This argument would be valid so long as the
anticipated pattern of events for each household was the
IV-17
actual pattern. However, chance usually takes a hand,
and alters events such that the utility maximizing bundle
at time to is no longer the utility maximizing bundle at
time to + t. Once again, so long as we make a certain
assumption, this poses no difficulties. The assumption is
that movement from one bundle to another is frictionless,
or at worst such costs are not significant compared to the
total utility function. In such a case, as expected
utilities change, the location pattern will change, and the
system will always be in equilibrium.
This does not seem to be the case in the real world,
however. Moving costs can be very significant, or the
household may not even be aware of the existence of better
alternatives, that is, there are search costs involved.
I stated earlier that these deviations from the optimal
package would be accounted for by the tie range mechanism.
This might be true if we had some a priori knowledge about
the magnitude of these costs and what an appropriate tie
range might be. In fact, increasing the tie range to $60
($5 per month) would no doubt result in the model correctly
locating many more strata. It would also, unfortunately,
result in more mislocated strata, and without more informa-
tion, we cannot really justify a particular value of the
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tie mechanism.
If these costs are not minimal, then many households
will not be in their optimum packages. Due to the nature
of an optimum, they can only deviate to the lower side.
Therefore, when we estimate the utility functions, we might
get biased estimates of the true parameters, that is, the-
C's are not spherical. Tracing it through, then, we can
see that an assumption of an equilibrium might lead to a
model that produces very different results from the reality.
The model as postulated lacks many of the character-
istics of the true housing market, some of which play a
very important role in distorting our resultp. Some of
these problems have been alluded to previously; they will
be examined in more deoth here.
A. As we saw earlier, the base run allocated almost
as many blacks as whites to the zones in East Boston, while
it left most areas in Roxbury almost completely white. It
is clear Why this has occurred -- there is no explicit
segregation built into the model. To phrase this another
way, we could say that there is positive utility to living
in close proximity to similar people, and a strong disutility
to dissimilar people, especially those of another race.
Some of this might be implicit in the estimated parameters;
IV-19
that is, the fact that blacks are relegated to high-density,
low quality units might show up as a liking of such units,
meaning that lot size, rooms, and similar normally positive-
utility variables would have negative utility. In fact,
the estimations showed that all but five of the twenty-
three black strata had negative utility for LOTSIZE, while
fourteen had positive utility for travel costs (which was
uniformly negative for white strata). In general, the pre-
ponderance of wrong signs was in the black strata. This
did not result in a segregated housing pattern. Rather,
the tendency seemed to be that blacks of a certain income
group would locate in neighborhoods dominated by whites of
lower income groups. Poor blacks, however, were generally
lumped together. It is clear that if we wanted to reproduce
the actual housing pattern, we would have to introduce
some concept of segregation, to limit the choices of certain
subgroups.
A number of solutions present themselves, none of them
very satisfactory. First, one could include in the utility
function a measure of the percent of a stratum's representa-
tion in the tract; and then use such a measure in the simu-
lations. The major problem with this is that with each
iteration, the makeup of the tract is different, and each
stratum would thus have changing utility for the same zone.
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Clearly, this would make the equilibrium solution dependent
on both the starting point and the path used to approach
it. Since we have admitted that the iterations have no
real-world counterparts, but are merely a means to an end,
having that end dependent on the means is clearly unde-
sirable.
A second approach would be to assert that there is some
constant monetary disutility associated with blacks. For
instance, if we could say that blacks are worth $10 per
month less than whites, we could subtract $120 from all
black bids. This is a rather simplistic view, and avoids
the argument that different areas discriminate to different
extents against different ethnic groups. Any attempt to
include these last considerations would, under any plan
that I could envision, lead to a predetermination of the
results, thus rendering the model insignificant. Before
we could include a phenomenon as complex as explicit segre-
gation, then, considerable study would be called for.
B. A problem with the data rather than the structure
of the model is that of using census tract means. I strongly
pointed out in the beginning of this paper that housing is
among the most heterogeneous of goods available on the
market. How, then, can we assume that the one to eight
thousand housing units in a census tract may be adequately
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represented by the means of that tract? Also, as pointed
out before, if we average a very fine housing unit and a
very poor housing unit, we will get two very mediocre
housing units. If the poor unit would have been occupied
by stratum 111, and the good one by stratum 168, we will
not get these same strata locating in the averages, but
maybe two households of type 134. This is a major reason
why the model fits the reality no better than it does, and
is also a reason why the more homogeneous suburban zones
are predicted better than the heterogeneous urban zones.
The necessity for using means (or some other 'repre-
sentative' value) might seem to invalidate the model if
we claim that heterogeneity is the order of the day. How-
ever this problem was more than adequately solved with a
concept espoused in the Arthur D. Little study of the San
Francisco area. This is the concept of a "fract", a homo-
geneous group of houses located within the borders of a
heterogeneous zone. The fract has no particular location
within the zone, it is simply the group of all similar housing
types. Breaking the 436 zones of the model into 1500 or so
fracts would, while significantly increasing the cost, also
overwhelmingly increase the predictive power thereof. Costs
of data acquisition would be quite high, however, since one
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would either have to resort to original Census data or con-
struct a survey especially for the study. Carried to an
extreme, the fracts could be individual housing units,
and the ultimate in disaggregation would have been purchased,
albeit at very great cost. Some work in this direction,
however, does seem to be very desirable.
C. Aggregation of the strata seems to be at least as
big a problem as that of the census means. By saying that
all white, single persons earning 10 to 14 thousand dollars
a year will behave similarly is an heroic assumption.
Additionally, we have no household age variable, and we
therefore lose more valuable life-cycle differentiation.
Lumping many dissimilar households in to the same stratum
would lead to estimations that produce very questionable
parameters, since we would be trying to fit one curve to
points that lie on many different curves. For instance,
we have only three income categories for the entire $10,000
plus bracket, and yet it is very difficult to believe that
there are only three types of preference above this figure.
Once again, we are faced with an economic decision -- the
formulation of the model is good in theory, but we are
forced to resort to unnatural levels of aggregation in
order to hold down costs. It would be preferable to in-
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crease the number of strata, but it is necessary to have
a degree of aggregation sufficient to allow meaningful
estimations. The aggregation which we have used might very
well lead to differences between model and reality, since
we may be trying to predict the behavior of a group that
does not behave as a group.
An associated problem is the question of whether the
observed consumption patterns represent revealed preferences
over all possible alternatives, or merely over a limited
submarket. This returns us to our argument about segre-
gation and other market imprefections, in that if a decision-
maker's choice set is limited to certain packages, we cannot
say anything about his preferences in relation to opportuni-
ties outside that choice set. Making the assumption that
the choice set consists of all available alternatives is
equivalent to reinforcing the existing location pattern,
since it says that the presently consumed unit is prefer-
able to all other packages, while in reality it may be the
optimum only within a certain available subset. This type
of bias will not be so evident in our model, since it
would tend to produce a model solution very close to the
actual solution, rather than causing divergence. It is
also unclear how one could define the available choice sets
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without again predetermining the outcome of the model.
D. A large part of the diversity of the housing market
has not even been included in the model. This includes
such features as the myriad architectural characteristics
of the unit, the "status" of the neighborhood, microclimate,
and dozens of other features that are either unquantifiable
or would cost too much to include in the model. Most of
these features were deliberately left out; what the model
tries to do is predict general trends of locational behavior
given as few salient characteristics of the housing stock
as possible. However, the abovementioned qualities go a
long way towards explaining both prices of housing and lo-
cational behavior on the individual scale, and such non-
normal disturbances as a "high-status" neighborhood could
easily bias the results.
Finally, there is another question of data which has
not been treated before. For each zone, only one accessi-
bility measure is computed. However, it should be fairly
obvious that accessibility for a rich family with two cars
is not the same as for a poor individual with no car. This
is not a question of how much the household values access-
ibility, it is more a question of how to define it. Sim-
ilarly, accessibility from Newton is not the same for in-
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dividuals who work in Newton as for those who work down-
town. If we assume that employment among people in a part-
icular stratum is distributed the same as that in the parent
population, then we can use one accessibility measure for
all stratum, at least as far as concerns this particular
problem. As long as we are assuming that employment is
distributed independently of housing, it might be interesting
to see the effects of using a different accessibility matrix
for each stratum, based on both the modal split common to
each stratum and its particular distribution of employ-
ment. Once again, it is somewhat unclear what kind of bias
would be introduced into the model by using such an aggre-
gate accessibility measure.
I have, in these pages, pointed up a number of imper-
fections that exist and compromises that were made in the
model. In light of these faults, is this model useful for
anything, and can we draw any meaningful conclusions from
it? My answer is an emphatic yes. Simplifications have
been made, but few of these simplifications actually dis-
rupt the theory behind the model, rather, they are made for
cost considerations. If we accept the results of the base
run as our test city, and apply policies to that city, we
should get the same sort of results as if we were to apply
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these same policies to the Boston SMSA, holding all factors
not in the model constant. What the model gives us is a
laboratory in which we can assess the impacts of social
actions at low cost and ceteris paribus. This is what we
want to know - what is the impact of a particular policy,
not what will be the state of the city twenty years from
now. The former is controllable by the policy maker, the
latter is a sum of both policies and random influences.
Since this model is an equilibrium model, and the city is
rarely allowed to reach equilibrium after a particular per-
turbation, we will not be able to predict total system re-
sponses. We can however, make meaningful statements about
the direction and magnitude of impacts on the urban pattern
of policies, independent of other effects. It is in this
spirit that we proceed to the next section, in which we
analyze a number of possible market interventions.
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POLICY RUNS - ALTERATIONS IN THE HOUSING STOCK
In this section, I begin to examine what can be done
with this model of the urban residential location decision
in terms of testing various public and private policies.
This chapter is devoted to an examination of two policies
that deal exclusively with alterations or additions to the
existing housing stock, seeking to discover the market re-
sponse. The two strategies that were tried were renova-
tion of the inner-city housing stock and construction of
low-income housing in the suburban towns.
URBAN RENEWAL
For much of the past decade-and-a-half, the bulldozer
and crane, used on a massive scale, have been important
tools in the planner's repertoire. The prevailing view
was that the only way to save the cities is by upgrading
the housing stock in the downtown area and thereby attract
a 'higher class' of people back into the city. Naturally,
this view is contingent on viewing the city as more than a
daytime place to transact business. However, "urban re-
newal" often came to be an obscene word when it referred
to wholesale destruction of inner-city areas and the sub-
sequent dislocation of thousands of families who could
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ill-afford to move.
What I have attempted to simulate in this policy -run
is a sane renewal program consisting of both construction
of new high-rise, luxury buildings and renovation of many
existing units. Moderation has two aims -- the social aim
of not uprooting an impossible number of people and thereby
creating more ill than good, and the modelling aim of being
able to trace the impact of the policy (that is, not have
too many factors changing at once). In fact, some of the
changes that were made in the housing stock are changes
that are either currently occurring or are slated to occur
in the near future.
A brief verbal discussion of the changes being made is
important here, although a complete listing can be found
on the page following. We slated only three areas for high-
rise, luxury apartments. These are zone 31 (southwest of
Boston Common, future home of part of Park Plaza), zone 33
(currently the home of Charles River Park, some of which was
not included in the base run) and zone 44 (along Massachusetts
Avenue at the site of the Christian Science development).
These units were designed with small lot sizes, exceptional
plumbing, a fairly good room size for the city, and relatively
low mean ages (since the original.estimations only used ages
between 30 and 50 years in general, it was felt that the
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RENOVATION OF THE HOUSING STOCK
NEW ZONE
(OLD ZONE)
AGE
40.0
(49.999)
40.0
(48.122)
40.0
(48.916)
40.0
(48.147)
20.0
(34.498)
37.0(47.435)
20.0
(49.999)
30.0
(48.042)
35.0
(47.911)
40.0
(47.834)
42.0
(48.027)
40.0
(49.545)
40.0
(49.183)
35.0
(49.324)
35.0(49.999)
40 0(49.999)
ROOMS
5.399
5.357
5.103
5.507
6.0
(2.803)
4.5
(3.541)
6.0
(3.507)
6.0
(3.909)
6.0
(3.485)
5.0
(3.602)
3.455
4.483
4.5
(4.139)
5.0
(3.194)
5.5
(3.649)
5.636
LOTSIZE
.021
.019
.016
.018
.005
(.002)
.01(.001)
.005(.016)
.005
.02
(.005)
.01
(.003)
.006
.006
.007
.015
(.011)
.01
(.004)
.019
PLUMBING
.002
(.139)
.002
(.141)
.002
(.337)
.002
(.152)
.002
(.109)
.02
(.166)
.002
(.369)
.002
(.192)
.002
(.082)
.002
(.146)
.02
(.048)
.02
(.232)
.02
(.291)
.02
(.459)
.02
(.376)
.02
(.137)
# OF UNITS
907
587
577
1026
1200
(73)
265
(535)
1200
(58)
1345
3000
(4131)
1800
(2.
4527
1124
35)
946
280
(461)
250
(396)
371
11
12
31
32
33
44
49
50
53
54
.56
57
58
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introduction of units with ages of less than 20 years would
introduce severe distortions into the model because of large
prediction errors in that range). The other changes in the
housing stock, also in or around the downtown area, consist
mainly of renovation and facelifting. The zones selected
were those that commanded rents of less than $1000 in the
base run and had a significant number of units (thus elim-
inating the CBD zones 25 and 29). For instance, four zones
in East Boston (6, 8, 11 and 12) were characterized by bad
plumbing (in excess of 10% substandard). Renovation was
simulated by fixing up all the plumbing and trimming the
mean ages by nine to ten years. This latter move, which
was done to varying extent in other zones, was used as a
proxy for general improvement in the condition of the unit.
Zones 50 (Fenway), 53 (Massachusetts and Columbia Avenues)
and 58 (South Boston) were treated the same way. Finally,
zones 45 and 49 (Back Bay-Fenway) and 54, 56, and 57
(southern part of South End) were more extensively renovated.
Plumbing was improved, general renovation was simulated
through age reductions, and both mean rooms and mean lot-
size were increased. This last would simulate either the
replacement of old buildings with new, somewhat roomier
structures or merely the interior conversion of some exist-
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ing structures. In total, the renewal and renovating project
resulted in an increase of 406 units in the housing stock,
about .05% of the base run stock.
When designing an experiment such as has been described,
we no doubt have certain a priori expectations about the
outcome, as must planners who implement such programs (with
no allowance for error as we have in a model). A project
is designed to achieve certain goals, and the designer
should have an idea of how well he can meet these goals.
Therefore, I shall present a short discussion of the re-
sults that we could expect from our experiment, given nor-
mal market response. We can then compare the results of
the model to these expectations, and thus determine simul-
taneously how well the model reproduces these forces and
how intuitive or counterintuitive the results are.
The easiest impact to determine is that of the high-
rise development. From the base run, it can be observed
that mean age is a variable with great leverage, that is,
low values have a very high impact on rents. We can also
see that the small room size (relative to the suburban
tracts) will be insufficient to attract'large families.
We would therefore suspect, from these observations and
from prior experience with such development, that these
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developments will attract the smaller, richer strata.
Since 117 and 118 are not in the model, we would expect to
find 127 and 128, or possibly 137 and 138, if we assume
that these are young professionals just starting families,
who will probably move to larger quarters as their families
grow.
The other areas are not so clear, since the changes
being made are not nearly so sweeping. For instance,
despite the renovation in East Boston, there is still
Logan Airport and the other noxious land uses to cope with.
The units also remain rather small in terms of mean rooms.
We would not expect the richest strata, then, to locate
in these units, but rather middle-income, mid-size house-
holds, such as strata 125, 135, 136, 236,et cetera. In
zones 32, 49, and 56-58, we have the same type renovation,
and would expect generally the same results. Zones 50,
53, and 54 have very small rooms and lotsize, but also
good plumbing (although not excellent), so we might expect
some of the smaller, middle-income strata to locate there
(i.e. 115, 124, 125). Finally, zones 45 and 49, being
somewhat larger but also somewhat older than the ones just
mentioned, would probably have somewhat larger households
than the former, but the income spread would probably not
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be very great.
Determining the secondary impacts on location is much
more difficult, and will not be attempted here. However,
we can say something about the expected impact on the rent
structure and the utility levels. The effect of the stock
alterations will be to increase the supply of units at many
higher "quality" levels (if we may for a moment think of
housing as measurable unidimensionally in "quality"), and
decrease the stock at the very lowest levels. Therefore,
most strata inhabiting the higher levels will have to bid
less to command the same level of quality. With everything
else constant, those strata commanding the low quality units
would have to pay more, and their utility should decline.
However, by renovating the units that we have, we have
removed from the stock those units that provided the
numeraire; in fact, the rent structure would have to drop
quite a bit just to resatisfy the requirement that the
marginal unit rent for the reservation price. This drop
in the rent structure would partially or totally offset
the decrease in supply at the low quality levels, and thus
we would expect the rents on all units (save for the con-
verted or rebuilt ones) to be lower and the utilities of
most strata to be higher or about the same.
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The renovation run was started with the final utilities
from the base run,and reached a fairly good equilibrium
within 100 iterations. The results were good; in most cases
predictable, in some cases very surprising. The most im-
portant are reported here.
As I said above, the effects of the high-rise develop-
ment should be easiest to forecast, and the results bear
out that statement. Typical of urban renewal, the rich
moved in and the poor moved out. In all three high-rise
zones, stratum 128 was the high bidder. Surprisingly,
stratum 226 also appeared in the Fenway zone, but due to
its small size (1274 households) and the fact that the
model only located 672 of them, it is difficult to draw
any general conclusions about the location pattern. It
is also interesting to note that while rents in 31 and 33
were only separated by $374, due to the indifference in
LANDUSEl, zone 44 was $1250 less than the lower of these
two, which shows the tremendous importance of age and
accessibility, the only two variables on which 31 and 45
significantly differ.
As predicted, the renovations Tiere clearly dominated
by the middle-income and mid-size households. First, let
us look at East Boston. The renovated tracts were upgraded
in both income and family size, but also showed a tendency
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to become black. For instance, tract 6, previously
resided in by strata 125, 126 and 224, now is captured
by 236 and 266. These same strata, with the addition of
246, pushed the former (plus 115) out of zone 8. Again,
these same strata bid highest on zones 11 and 12, but here
they merely superseded poorer blacks, namely 224 and 234.
In zones 32, 49, and 56-58, which were mentioned earlier
as being renovated in a similar fashion, we find the white,
middle-income strata dominant, specifically 115, 124, 125,
135, 145, and 165. Surprisingly, though, we find 111 and
121 also making themselves at home in 56 and 57, possibly
owing to the small rooms. Generally, the ousted strata
were black (214, 215, 234) but 121 and 126 also declined
the new quarters. Stratum 124 also staked a claim on the
renewed units of zone 45, which had been vacant before.
This is not surprising, since aside from the larger rooms,
this tract does not differ much from the preceeding five,
where we also find 124. Finally, we have zones 50, 53 and
54, those zones which were renovated but still allowed
to remain primarily small units. Zones 53 and 54 went
exclusively to stratum 121, while 50 was split between
121 and 215. Displaced from 53 and 54 were 111, 211, and
115. We can see that there is not much difference between
V-10
those that moved out and those that moved in. In fact,
the only important difference is in the household size,
which increased due to the small increase in unit size.
Predictions about the rent structure and utility
levels were also borne out, with somewhat surprising re-
sults. Rents throughout the SMSA dropped dramatically.
Even in areas such as Weston, Wayland, and Sudbury, where
the location pattern was completely unaffected, rents
dropped by approximately $60. Closely substitutable tracts,
that is, tracts at about the same "quality level" as the
newly converted zones, seem to have the widest swings in
the rents, as for example zone 95, which rented for $1393
before the renovation and only $1300 afterward. Zone 95
is fairly similar to the 56-58 group, so that the increase
in supply in that area tended to drive prices down.
As predicted, utilities of all groups increased.
However, the manner in which they increased far exceeded
expectations. Evidently, the effect of the general lowering
of rents far outweighed any added pressures on the market
at the lower end. While utilities for most of the strata
increased maybe 5% at the most, the utilities of strata
111, 121, 211, and 221 increased 23, 21, 12, and 726. Strata
124 and 125, who were directly affected by the renovations,
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increased utilities only 3 and 8%, respectively. However,
the structure of our model renders this result not quite
so surprising. Working with the equations U = M X i and
M = Y-R, we can easily show that the elasticity of utility
with respect to rent, (dU/U)/(dr/R), is equal to R/(R-Y).
Therefore, our low income groups, for whom rent is a large
part of income, will have very high negative elasticities,
and a small percent change in the rent structure will have
a substantial effect on the utility levels. As further
proof, we can look at stratum 128 which, while being one of
the strata most involved in the changes, experiences only a
.2% rise in utility.
It is difficult to generalize about the secondary
locational effects in this run. For instance, stratum 128,
which moved into the three new high-rise tracts, deserted
three other tracts to keep the supply constant. However,
the three tracts it deserted have very little in common.
Tract 19 consists of mid-size houses of fairly considerable
age in Charlestown, of mediocre condition but good access-
ibility. Zone 246 is similar in structural characteristics,
but its lower tax rate and crime expenditures make up for
the somewhat decreased accessibility of its Somerville
location. The third zone is most unlike the other two,
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in that it is a rich, large-rooms large-lotsize tract in
Newton. This zone (325) illustrates the heterogeneous nature
of the housing good and the willingness of strata to pay
more for more housing services. However, it also points
up how difficult it is to predict which zones will be
deserted by which strata, since the shape of the bid-rent
curve is so complex. Therefore, I will attempt to point
out the more interesting outcomes, but will not draw many
general conclusions.
Some zones, not in the renovation plan, underwent
extreme changes. For instance, zone 95, a Dorchester zone
that was formerly the home of stratum 111, is now in addi-
tion the residence of middle-income strata 125, 126, 136,
145, and 146. However, since this was an area attractive
to these groups in the base run (they located in 92, 93,
96, and 98; all are adjacent to 95) we should not be sur-
prised that a small change in the rent structure would
attract them into this additional zone. Most of the changes
in the suburban communities were similar; strata entering
or deserting zones very similar to ones they were already
in. That is, most of these locational changes are more
significant as adjustments within the model than indicative
of changing preferences. We must note the behavior of
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stratum 211, though, which when evicted by urban renewal
from zones 53 and 54, relocated in 23 and 26, which it
shares with the illustrious company of strata 128. The
reason for this is fairly clear. Since we did not restrict
the strata in our model to those with "correct" signs from
the estimations, wrong signs, such as those for plumbing
for strata 211 and 128, were allowed to operate. Zones
23 and 26 have nearly 50% substandard plumbing, and are
thus "attractive" to these strata. This points up the
need for more disaggregate data, since it is difficult to
believe that such a rich stratum as 128 would reveal a
preference for bad plumbing.
What have we learned from this experiment? About
19000 housing units in the base run have been replaced or
altered, comprising about 2% of the housing stock. The
renovations clearly had a large impact on the concerned
zones in terms of location, and significantly lowered the
general rent profile. Perhaps most significantly, the
secondary effects of the rent decrease raised the utility
of those strata who need it most in many opinions, that is,
the poorest strata. Secondary locational effects were not
extensive, and those relocations that did occur were
generally among similar strata. We could conclude then,
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that a moderate renewal plan combining both new construction
and renovation, would have positive effects on the urban
residential market.
LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS
Slum conditions are generally conceded to be fostered
by the proximity of low-quality housing, and low-quality
housing is often thought to be the exclusive province of
the poor. Therefore, if we can disperse the poor, wouldn't
we be able to eliminate all the social ills associated with
slums? This is the reasoning, whether right or wrong, that
led me to conduct this experiment. The basic premise here
was to establish housing in the suburbs that would be
attractive to low income groups. Hopefully, the poor
would be attracted to the suburbs, the slum-dwelling groups
would be dissipated and therefore slum conditions would not
be able to develop.
The zones that were selected for low-income develop-
ment had to be suffuciently far from the center of the
city that there would be vacant land available for develop-
ment, yet hopefully not so far that they would be totally
inaccessible. Accordingly, twenty zones just outside
Route 128 were selected, and were developed according to
the amount of residential land already there. A full listing
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of the zones used is shown on the next page, but we should
note here that the new zone numbers are merely the corres-
ponding original zone number plus 500; that is, zone 875
had the same neighborhood as zone 375 in the base run.
This is an application of the fract concept mentioned
earlier; zones 375 and 875 have the same geographical lo-
cation but different housing characteristics.
Expectations for the results are not as positive as
for the previous policy. To reflect the fact that these
were new units, we used an age variable of 20 years. As
pointed out before, age has considerable leverage, espec-
ially among the richer strata. Since the units are rela-
tively small, we would not expect the larger strata to be
attracted, but it seems reasonable to suspect that the small,
wealthier strata will outbid the poor for these units, in
light of the fact that we have placed no restrictions on
who may inhabit the units. However, the addition of some
21000 houses to the stock will send all rents plummeting,
no matter who inhabits those new units. To reestablish
equilibrium, then, many of the worst tracts (which are
generally inner-city tracts) will be' vacated, and it is
this second-level effect which may help to eliminate the
slum conditions.
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LOW-INCOME HOUSING ZONES
)NE NUMBER
672
674
789
792
835
839
840
841
843
870
875
876
878
880
885
888
892
910
921
LOCATION
Peabody
Lynnfield
Reading
Woburn
Lexington
Burlington
Bedford
Lincoln
Weston
Wellesley
Needham
Needham
Dedham
Westwood
Norwood
Canton
Milton
Braintree
Hingham
TRAVEL
COSTS
33.049
34.056
33.549
32.201
32.105
34.918
40.326
32.753
29.518
25.687
26.843
26.843
27.771
30.265
33.852
33.049
29.725
31.375
49.156
LANDUSE1
.053
.033
.048
.212
.036
.089
.018
.005
.022
.013
.024
.044
.012
.041
.182
.064
.013
.085
.049
LANDUSE2
.058
.092
.026
.012
.048
.004
.006
.014
.07
.033
.028
.018
.028
.047
.014
.145
.339
.01
.014
PUPIL
RATIO
26.118
22.198
24.777
24.863
20.455
22.504
21.567
24.229
20.142
19.928
22.214
22.214
23.18
18.093
22.614
23.285
21.887
21.085
22.810
CRIMEEXP
25.103
20.718
29.049
19.886
23.999
23.266
20.989
15.879
34.501
34.056
37.338
37.338
32.95
35.163
26.443
25.79
39.252
28.818
40.246
tL ZONES:
AGE: 20.0
ROOMS: 5.5
LOTSIZE: .100
PLUMBING: .100
PROPTAX
.039
.035
.038
.047
.050
.056
.048
.026
.032
.038
.045
.045
.044
.040
.038
.045
.034
.048
.049
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Again, the run was started with the final utilities
from the base run, and reached a reasonable equilibrium
within three 50-iteration runs. Results were mostly pre-
dictable, but interesting nonetheless (much of the pre-
dictability seems to stem from an intense familiarity with
the workings and limitations of the model, rather than any
omniscient understanding of market forces).
The outcome of the run ran true to our forecast.
Strata 125, 126 and 127 thoroughly dominated the new housing,
accounting for all but 3273 of the 21004 new units (the
others went to 136, 165, and 235). Clearly, the poor were
not attracted to these units; in fact, only three of the
new units rent for less than $1500, which does not make them
prime targets for poor residents.
Secondary effects of this policy were significant,
however. Many of the zones that were marginal in the base
run went vacant due to the excess supply. Newly vacant
zones were 11 and 12 (East Boston), 29, 30 and 31 (South
End),- and 58 (South Boston). Three zones in Lynn (187, 194
and 195) also went vacant, as did one in Chelsea (432).
Generally, these zones were vacated by poor or black strata
such as 111, 121, 211, 214, 224 and 234. We might say, then,
that the upgrading in the suburbs caused a "filtering" down-
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ward of the good stock and thereby a general upgrading of
housing.
Rents in this run fell considerably more than in the
previous one, most drops being in the $100 to $140 range.
This more than anything else helps to increase the utility
of the various strata, such as 221, which experienced a 170f%
rise in its utility level. No matter what we feel about
utility measures, this is certainly a significant rise.
There were some changes in the locational pattern,
especially within Boston, that were very interesting. East
Boston continued the trend towards black dominance, as the
middle-income white strata took advantage of lower rent
levels to vacate, allowing more blacks to move in (although
224 and 234 saw fit to leave zones 11 and 12 completely
vacant). In fact, East Boston seems to be one of the
least desirable areas in the model, with two of its twelve
zones vacant and four others partially vacant. Contrast
this with Roxbury, which, while the target of many social
reformers, has only two zones out of twenty-one renting for
less than $1400, and none for less than $1100. Of course,
much of this is due no doubt to the lack of differentiation
among the neighborhood variables, but it also points up the
surprising quality of some "ghetto" housing.
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Some of the filtering of the housing stock manifested
itself in a flight to the suburbs of the middle class. For
instance, many of those in strata 136, 146 and 156, who lo-
cated in Roxbury, South Dorchester and Hyde Park wound up
in the more suburban zones of Watertown, Waltham and Woburn.
Richer strata, such as 137, 147 and 157, moved further out,
going from Melrose and Belmont to Wellesley and Milton.
Both of the housing stock adjustment policies resulted
in benefits for all strata in the model. This is not sur-
prising, as relieving some of the demand pressure is bound
to be beneficial. However, there are effects which the
model does not foresee. First, it assumes that there is
no response to demand other than that which we stipulate in
our policies. That is, the equilibrium that the model assumes
is a short-run equilibrium-in which there is no supply re-
sponse such as new construction or conversion, and the only
adjustments that occur in the market occur on the demand
side. Unfortunately, this may mask some of the after-
effects of our policies. For instance, we have seen that
rents drop precipitously after the introduction of either
of our policies, but especially the second. It is possible
that such a change in the income stream could significantly
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alter investment decisions among home-builders, and thus
have an unexpected long-run effect on the city. Similarly,
implementation of the policies that we have proposed might,
rather than augmenting the housing stock, merely replace
private initiative with public programs. Private developers
who might step in to fill the need for replacement housing
(which is one way of reading a dynamic aspect into a static
model) might be deterred by the public program, for fear of
glutting the market, and thus we would be left no better
off than before. These and other secondary effects, which
could be better handled in a dynamic model, must be assumed
to be of negligible importance here.
We can, however, make some important generalized con-
clusions from these two runs. First, due to the large mar-
ginal utility of income to those at the low end of the
earnings scale, any relief on the housing market that re-
sults in a general decrease in rents, whether it starts at
the high or low end,.will be reflected in a significant in-
crease in utility for those strata. Second, we can say that
small-scale perturbations of the housing stock only have
limited locational implications, especially as we become
more and more removed from the source. Many of the moves
that we noted may be due to the fact that the model did not
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reach a perfect equilibrium in either run, and that the
final pattern is therefore a function of the particular
iteration as well as the sum of all the market forces. We
knew beforehand that increasing the supply would lead to
lower prices, as in elementary economic theory; now let us
move on and observe what happens when we alter the pressures
on the demand side without affecting supply.
POLICY RUNS - TRANSFER PAYMENTS
An oft-espoused method for lifting the poor out of
their housing miseries is the transfer payment, that is,
give them a certain amount of money and let them spend it
to purchase more in the way of housing services. This trans-
fer payment can take one of two general forms: no strings
attached, or strings attached. In the former, the re-
cipient gets a lump sum that is in no way tied to his ex-
penditures on housing; he can spend the money any way he
wishes. The latter restricts the money in some way such
that the amount of the transfer is dependent on the way it
is spent.
The former method is clearly the most efficient, especi-
ally in terms of a utility-maximizing model, since it allows
the recipient, by varying expenditures on all commodities
-as he sees fit, to purchase the optimum bundle (in his view)
for a given amount of money. The latter method implicitly
states that the policy maker's goals are necessarily diff-
erent than and preferable to those of the recipient, and
therefore the recipient's behavior pattern should be altered
by use of incentives to fit those goals. Since neither
approach has yet achieved a clear-cut victory in the
sociological battle, I have attempted to simulate each type
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of policy in the model, namely an income-allowance policy
and a rent-subsidy policy. Each will be discussed in turn.
RENT SUBSIDY
The rent-subsidy is a policy of the latter type,
that is, there are strings attached. What it amounts to
is that the amount of the subsidy is in direct proportion
to the rent on the unit. For this run, I elected to use
only the two poorest income groups as subjects.- Unlike many
studies of rent subsidies, the structure of this model re-
quires a 100% participation rate below a certain income
level and 0% above it. This does not introduce any great
theoretical complications.
It was decided that the government would directly
subsidize the rents offered by these low income groups in
all housing units, regardless of quality or location. For
this run, the amount of the subsidy was fixed at 30% of
the total rent (or alternatively, the subsidy was calculated
as 43% of the stratum's bid-rent for a unit: R+S=R', S=.3R'=
.3(R+S), .7S=.3R, S=.43R). Since we used the two lowest
income groups, strata eligible for the program were 111, 112,
121, 122, 211, 212, 221, 222 and 231, or about one-eighth
of the total population. Final utilities from the base run
were again used, and equilibrium required about 150 iterations.
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Let us again try to investigate the theoretical con-
sequences of the policy we have implemented. Perhaps the
most obvious implication is that by introducing more spend-
ing power into the economy while not simultaneously in-
creasing the amount of goods available, prices will ex-
perience a general rise. Due to this price increase, the
forty-five strata not participating in the rent-subsidy
program will have their utilities lowered. The nine poor
strata will all have their utilities raised, since the
only way they could be lowered would be if the rent
structure rose by more than 30%, which is impossible since
it would require raising all incomes (or rents) by 30%.
Questions of location are more difficult to resolve,
however. We can make some predictions about the behavior
of bids. Let us look at the strata participating in the
program. If we denote, the base run rent and utility levels
as R? and U and the new equilibrium levels as R . and
Ui 1 13
U, then it can be easily shown that
R - R. = C -C. where C - .4 Y13 13 li 21 ij 1iM03Y
C0 . = ((1.43U + Ue)
21 11
We can see, then, that a rent-subsidy program will increase
bid-rents differentially, and the absolute differential
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will be greatest where IT77 is the smallest, or where the
original bid was the largest. We can see that the bid rent
functions of those strata in the program will become steeper,
and we can expect to find them more concentrated in their
preferred areas. The only problem is that we cannot identi-
fy those tracts for which a stratum offers its highest bid;
we can find only those tracts on which it is the highest
bidder. It thus becomes very difficult to determine before-
hand who will locate where. We can say something about
where certain strata will definitely decline to locate,
however. For instance, we know that stratum 121 will in-
crease its bids on its favored zones much more than on the
less favored zones. It can also be seen on inspection that
its bids for zones 29, 30 and 31 ($945, $1046, and $1074)
are relatively low compared to the other tracts in which
it is located. We do not therefore expect this bid to in-
crease much; in fact, it might very well decrease. Since
bids of non-subsidized strata are increasing, we would not
expect to find 121 in these zones in the new equilibrium
(and, to eliminate the suspense, we don't).
Further locational implications are very difficult to
work out. Since the very poor strata will be vacating
certain low-attractiveness zones, and we have done nothing to
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the supply side, we would expect that the next-poorest
strata such as 113 or 213 would move in. Beyond this, the
workings of the market become too complex, and we can prob-
ably learn more by moving right on to the results.
As expected, the poorer strata deserted the less
attractive zones in droves. Stratum 111 totally vacated
former strongholds in East Boston, Charlestown and the
South End, while the four poor white strata (111, 112, 121,
122) all moved out of the northern halves of Roxbury and
Dorchester. Startum 211 left its enclave in the South End
to move to somewhat better quarters in Charlestown, the
North End, and South Boston. Strata 111 and 121, having
deserted the northern halves, begin to take over the
southern parts of Roxbury and Dorchester, in general getting
larger units and a less noxious land use mix. Many of the
other moves within these poorest strata were moves within
towns, for instance an upgrading within Lynn, which are
more difficult to grasp intuitively, but which often rep-
resent an improvement in land use mix and unit size (espec-
ially number of rooms).
Strata 112 and 122 are ones that made extensive and
impressive moves. Large numbers of them left South Boston,
Dorchester and Roxbury, as well as such non-Boston areas as
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Malden, Medford, Everett and Somerville. With the rent
subsidy, they were able to move into much better areas,
specifically Belmont, Newton, Brookline, Needham and Milton.
Two of the black strata showed significant improvement in
their situations, moving from small-room, bad plumbing zones
in Cambridge (stratum 222 moved from zone 218) and Malden
(212 moved from zone 276) to two very nice Brookline zones.
Stratum 231 upgraded its situation without moving far in
space, simply shifting from zone 246 to 244 in Somerville.
Stratum 221, the last stratum in the program, did not
command any zones in the final near-equilibrium, so I am
unable to report on any moves.
These improvements were not without any cost, however.
Although the less attractive units could be vacated by the
above strata, they have to be occupied, since we have added
nothing to the housing stock. Actually, some stayed vacant;
no one moved into zones 29, 30 and 31 after stratum 121
moved out. On the other hand, zone 45, which was vacant
in the base run, is now occupied by stratum 224. The make-
up of the city changed in more noticeable ways than just the
shifting of vacancies, however. Many strata which had
successfully outbid the poor strata in the suburbs now had
to compete in the city as well. We note especially that
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strata 145, 146, 125, 135 and 136 seem to be close compet-
itors of 111. This is obvious in such zones as 72, which
was held exclusively by 111 in the base run and was shared
by all six of the aforementioned strata in the policy run.
We note all through the South End-Roxbury-Dorchester area
that the exodus of 111 is followed by an influx of white
strata in the fifth and sixth income brackets, although
appearances of the large (5 and 6) family sizes are rare.
These results are most surprising (at least to this writer)
in light of my earlier prediction that the new residents in
these zones would be in the third and fourth income classes.
Some zones were captured by these strata, but there does
not seem.to be any general trend as there was in the higher
income groups. It seems almost as if 111 and 121 exchanged
places with the six or eight middle class strata without
seriously disturbing the locations of too many other strata.
Most of the other relocations seem to be of the type en-
countered earlier, that is, only minor shifts due to the
imperfect nature of the equilibrium solution.
As expected, rents rose almost across the board. The
pattern was not at all generalizable, however, with rents
rising as much as $450 in the West End or falling as much
as $173 in the South End. In those areas which were un-
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affected by the policy (in terms of population turnover),
the rents increased by about $120.
What can this run tell us? What policy decisions are
indicated by the new location pattern? The first thing that
we see is that for dispersing the poor population and re-
turning the middle-class to the city, the rent subsidy is
much more effective than attempting to build low-cost and
low-class housing in the suburbs. The composition of
Boston proper changed radically, from poor to middle-income,
while the poor distributed themselves throughout the suburbs.
As mentioned before, this is not a costless policy. The
government, be it federal or local, must absorb the cost of
the rent subsidy, which is substantial for a program in-
volving 100,000 people. Also, the general increase in rents
leaves the other 700,000 worse off than in the base run.
It is no longer a question, as it was in the previous
policies, of taxing everyone to finance a policy that
leaves everyone better off. Here, the majority is left
worse off in terms of utility, and it is up to the policy-
maker to determine the values of the various tradeoffs
involved. If our aims are to disperse the people who are
generally associated with slum conditions while simultaneously
revitalizing the city, regradless of the expense to others,
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then the results of this run indicate that this policy
is highly desirable. However, if we wish to consider all
the people, then evaluation of the results must wait for
the development of a measure of social costs and benefits,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
INCOME ALLOWANCE
This is the no-strings type of income transfer policy.
The incomes of the low income group are supplemented by a
fixed, predetermined amount which can be spent as the parti-
cipant sees fit. We see that by imposing no restrictions
on this income, we allow the individual to maximize his
utility, and that this income transfer method is more effi-
cient than the rent subsidy plan. However, this plan also
contains the implicit assumption that the individual's
preference function is generally the same as society's; that
is, if society hopes to achieve better housing for the poor
by implementing a straight income transfer, it must assume
that the poor similarly value better housing. If it were
not that this last point is open to debate, there would be
very little reason for the rent-subsidy plan to be advocated.
In implementing this plan in the model, there is a large
question that must be overcome immediately. When we esti-
mated the utility functions initially, we were basing these
'..~- ,.~
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estimates on certain income patterns. What had to be
decided was whether supplementing the income of a low-income
group caused that group to alter its preference pattern, or
whether it merely followed its ori'ginal pattern but with
more resources at its disposal. Fortunately, there is a
neat way around this problem. The difficulty stems from
short-run versus long-run considerations, in that one would
be much more inclined to suspect a change in preference
given a permanent change in income rather than a transitory
one, since the former implies a change in expectations
rather than just resources for the moment. Since our model
implies a time horizon in excess of a few years, we assumed
that the income subsidization was a permanent one, and that
there would be a distinct change in preference functions.
Having no idea of what any intermediate preference
functions would look like, we moved the lowest income groups
up into the higher groups; that is, we made stratum 111 part
of 113, 122 part of 124,et cetera. We did this for 111, 112,
121, 122, 211, 212, 221, 222, and 231. The mechanics simply
consisted of increasing the sizes of. the 113, 114,et cetera
strata and 3liminating the nine listed above. Contained
here is the assumption that a household shifted into a
higher income group acquires the characteristics of that
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group, a contention which is certainly not attack-proof, but
which must do in lieu of a more developed experiment.
What can we expect from such an experiment? Obviously,
we are once again pumping money into the system without
altering the supply any, so in general we would expect a
rise in the rent structure. At the same time, though, we
are seriously distorting the market, by simply removing nine
bid-rent patterns from the market. We can not be sure, then,
that all rents will rise, since upward pressure from the
poorer strata will be removed from some zones. Utilities
of the non-subsidized groups will most likely fall, since
they now have to offer higher rents for the same locations.
For the subsidized groups we can make no conclusions about
utility, since changing the utility function eliminates
any comparability.
The results of the rent-subsidy run might give some
insight into possible results here. In the rent-subsidy,
the poor strata, especially 111, moved out of many center
city areas, and were succeeded in these areas by the smaller,
middle-income strata. Although this is not a voluntary move,
in that we are eliminating those strata, we still might ex-
pect these same middle-income strata to move into these areas.
It will be somewhat difficult to follow the migrations of the
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poor strata, since they are now indistinguishable from their
somewhat richer counterparts. Since these now enlarged
strata have not changed in any dimension other than size,
we might expect to find them spilling over into zones
neighboring those in which they were already located, since
these are usually very similar zones. Since generalizations
are difficult to make here, let us move directly to the
results.
The first thing that one notices on looking at the
results is that the enlarged strata only rarely moved out
of a zone; in fact, of all the zones, there were only ten
places where a stratum (of this enlarged group) did not
locate after having been there in the base run. We also
note that there are two large areas, zones 192-249 and
297-446 that are hardly affected in a locational sense at
all. This leaves only Boston and the northern suburbs as
those which were affected, although the intuitive explanation
for the latter is not so clear.
As predicted, the poor strata, violently ejected from
all areas, were followed by the middle-income strata. Most
of Boston proper, with the exception of Jamaica Plain,
Roslindale, and parts of South Boston, Dorchester, South
and East Boston, is now comprised of the fifth and sixth
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income groups, as it was in the rent-subsidy run.
There are many areas in which the poor stratum that
was eliminated was replaced by its richer counterpart,
possibly indicating that certain groups did not move. It
happens often with strata 111 and 113, but there are even
more areas where they locate independently, so it is not
obvious that we can draw any implications from this.
Also as predicted, rents in general went up, about
$90 to $100 in those areas which were generally unaffected
by the location changes. However, in the central city area,
rents were much more volatile. A new vacancy pattern de-
veloped as zones 29, 30 and 31 went vacant, while 45 was
newly inhabited. Those 24 zones for which rents declined
were, with one exception, exclusively inhabited in the base
run by the poorest strata. When we eliminate the strata in
this run, some of the pressure on these zones is relieved
and, if the zones are not especially attractive to other
strata, the rents will fall.
Again, it is difficult to draw any but generalized
locational implications from the model due to the imprecise
nature of the approximated solution. Many of the locational
changes we see are adjustments of the near-equilibrium
process. We do see, however, that this income-allowance
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program produces results that are very similar to the rent
subsidy program in the previous section. The poor strata
were enabled to buy better quality housing, and thus left
the central-city area in droves. Increased pressure on the
suburban housing markets caused some strata to move into
these city zones, especially the smaller, middle income
families. This last, however, hinges on the fact that we
have allowed for no new development on the fringe of the
city. Were we to operationalize the vacant land mechanism,
it is highly possible that the center city would be vacated
by all strata in this run. Effects of this unnatural
restriction are difficult to determine.
Both of these plans involve considerable and important
tradeoffs. Both the income allowance and the rent subsidy
help the strata that participate directly in the program,
but, unlike the housing stock programs, they increase the
demand pressure on the market rather than decreasing it,
thereby increasing rents for the non-participants. Both
programs raise the rent structure; it seems as if the rent
subsidy might raise it a little more, but the differences
are so small and so dependent on arbitrarily chosen factors
(e.g. the 30% subsidy and the amount of the income transfers)
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that any attempt to discuss the relative costs of the two
programs would be fruitless.
Without further development, these runs cannot really
determine which is the best policy. What they are useful
for, however, is to point up the implications of the various
policies and the questions that need to be addressed. In
any case, the final evaluation of a policy must lie with
the policymaker, not with the model. With this model, we
can only asses the relative direction and magnitude of the
impacts, and allow the policymaker to make more informed
decisions.
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CONCLUSIONS
Let us sit back and consider what has happened in
these past pages. We have constructed a rather elaborate
model of urban residential location, both in terms of the
operational mechanisms and the data requirements. What can
be learned from such an experiment; that is, what additional
information do we have about the locational process (or the
validity of the model) that makes this experiment worth the
time and the money expended? This section is an attempt to
answer this question both in light of the model as applied
to this experiment and the model as a theoretical exercise.
Also, some suggestions for further research (which presuppose
the validity of the model) will be put forth in the latter
part of this section.
First of all, the mbdel has proved to be reasonably
reliable in reproducing classical economic theory, in that
an increase in supply results in a general decrease in
prices, while an upward shift of the demand curve causes a
general increase in prices. It has gone much further than
this, however. The concepts of submerkets and partially-
substitutable commodities, central to any theory of a housing
market, are handled very well by this specification, as we
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saw in the income-allowance run, in which some zones were
almost totally changed over while a large block remained
almost perfectly stable. These submarkets have been at least
nebulously defined without the use of a measure of housing
"quality"; indeed, such a measure would be anathema to this
model, which depends on ordering of preferences that are
consistent only within a particular stratum. The results
of the base run, given the restrictions imposed by the data,
demonstrate the concept of the market being in a short-run
equilibrium is not all that far-fetched and that, if we
could model certain pervasive market imperfections such as
racial discrimination, we could get a relatively good repro-
duction of the existing housing pattern.
Data limitations were, I believe, the major pitfall of
this particular model application. The necessity for using
aggregate data, both for the zones and strata, greatly com-
promised the richness of the model by eliminating much of the
heterogeneity of the urban area. As pointed out in the
various sections, this led to mislocations galore. Theoret-
ically, I still have great faith in the model. In the more
suburban areas, where the data on zonal.characteristics is
much more likely to be representative of the entire zone
(due to the greater homogeneity of these zones, as well as
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the fact that the neighborhood data applies to smaller
areas), the model did an exceptionally good job of pre-
diction. This success might also seem to vindicate our
use of the tie mechanism as a proxy for certain market
frictions such as search and moving costs, although it does
not necessarily validate the particular value of the tie
range. In general, the short-term equilibrium seems to
be a fair approximation to the urban pattern, although the
effects of recent perturbations which have not fully worked
themselves out would tend to bias the market away from
this equilibrium. Given this, one can review the results
of the model as the solution that would occur given the
initial conditions, the specified perturbation (e.g. the
rent-subsidy or the renovation program), and sufficient
time,. free of all other disturbances, for the effects to be
felt throughout the system. We can see, then, that it
would be dangerous to use the quantitative output of the
model as a prediction of real-world occurrences, since the
last assumption, that of a period of time free of other
disturbances, will be constantly violated. I feel that
the model's strength lies in predicting the direction of
impact of a particular policy, and not the magnitude (or
especially the revealed magnitude) of the effect.
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Within this framework, I feel that there is much that
could be done with the model, some of it extensions and
some of it revisions in the original work. At the risk of
harping overlong on the same point., let me say that the first
order of business would be to obtain data on a more disaggre-
gated scale. For example, simply getting different crime
expenditure and-pupil-teacher ratio data for the various
Boston zones would have had a tremendous impact on the lo-
cation pattern, and might even eliminate the phenomenon of
whites in black zones and blacks in white zones. Different
stratification than that provided by the census might have
also been useful; the income classes are especially unreason-
able. Using the fract concept explained earlier would have
very positive effects; the more homogeneous the tract, the
more accurate would be the model's predictions.
There are all sorts of projects that could be attacked
with the model above and beyond refining the data. As we
saw in the suburban poor-housing construction run, accessi-
bility is a very important variable, and yet it hardly came
up in the discussion. One of the most interesting questions
in urban economics is how accessibility, that is, the trans-
portation system, affects the location pattern. One could
easily alter the accessibility measures to reflect proposed
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changes in the transportation system and observe the moves
that took place; this could be very important in assessing
the positive or negative impacts of such a system.
One factor that is already in the model, but was not
used, is the vacant land mechanism. It is well known that
one of the important responses to excess market demand is
the supply response of new construction. In the runs here,
however, we allowed only for price changes. Certainly, this
was a very restrictive assumption and, while allowing for
additional clarity in analyzing the results, serves at the
same time to bias these results away from reality. More
advanced experiments should certainly include developable
land. In fact, it would not be too difficult (although it
would be computationally expensive) to include a mechanism
that compared the profitability of an existing unit to the
profitability of razing that unit and constructing another
in its place. This would in effect provide an endogenous
urban renewal program, and would greatly enhance the dynamic
applicability of the model.
As mentioned in the text, there is no explicit segre-
gation in the model, and the methods which I proposed for
inclusion are obviously unsatisfactory. One fruitful area
of exploration would be the development of a segregation
mechanism, other than that revealed in the utility parameters
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(given an explicit segregation mechanism, we might posit
the effect of Fair Housing laws and their effect on the
housing pattern, which we cannot do if the phenomenon of
segregation is subsumed by the general utility estimation,
such that preferences and segregation effects are indistin-
guishable). Unfortunately, my thought experiments in this
direction have been less than satisfactory, and I cannot
suggest directions that research might take.
Finally, and perhaps most ambitiously, one might wish
to adapt the framework of this model to a location problem
other than housing, for example, the commercial location
problem. This might involve using a profitability function
instead of a utility function, and types of business rather
than strata, but it seems as if the formulation might be
much the same; that is, that the difference in rent.among
locations is a function of the different profitabilities
of these locations. This would be a Herculean task, in
light of the fact that enterprises can vary size as well
as location, and might not produce any better (or even as
good) results than other location models, but at the same
time it would be interesting to see just how well such a
model, strongly based in theory, would do.
This exercise has certainly been useful, both as.an
exploration of one modelling technique and as an effort to
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answer certain questions facing urban policymakers. An
equilibrium model, strongly grounded in a self-consistent
model of the urban system, has been shown to give a reason-
able reproduction of that system even when working with very
aggregate and dirty data. It has been shown to respond with
intuitive reasonableness to certain stimuli, both major and
minor, while at the same time being sufficiently complex as
to trace out some surprising second- and third-hand effects.
It has conceptual weaknesses, but few that could not be
rectified without disturbing the integrity of the model, On
balance, I feel that this model, when properly refined and
intelligently (and cautiously) analyzed, will be a valuable
addition to the successful understanding and management of
the urban residential location decision.
APPENDIX I
ZONE NUMBER CORRESPONDENCE
ZONES TOWN ZONES TOWN
1-12 East Boston 145-152 Brighton
14-22 Charlestown 153-156 Hyde Park
23-28 North End 159 Wenham
29-32 South End 160-165 Beverly
33-36 West End 166 Danvers
37-42 South End 169-173 Peabody
43-45 Back Bay 174 Lynnfield
46-47 West End 175-177 Saugus
48-51 Back Bay 178-197 Lynn
52-57 South End 198-204 Salem
58-71 South Boston 205 Marblehead
72-77 Dorchester North 206 Swampscott
78-81 Roxbury 207 Nahant
82 Dorchester North 208 Topsfield
83-85 Roxbury 209-238 Cambridge
86 Back Bay 239-253 Somerville
87-91 Roxbury 254-260 Everett
92-106 Dorchester North 261-269 Medford
107-115 Roxbury 270-278 Malden
116-121 Jamaica Plain 279-282 Melrose
122 Roslindale 283-284 Stoneham
123 Jamaica Plain 285-288 Wakefield
124-128 Roslindale 289 Reading
129-132 West Roxbury 290 North Reading
133-144 Dorchester South 291 Wilmington
A-I-2
ZONES
292-296
297
298-304
305-312
313-316
317-326
327-334
335-337
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346-350
351-353
354
356-367
368-371
372-376
377-379
380
381
382
TOWN
Woburn
Winchester
Arlington
Belmont
Watertown
Newton
Waltham
Lexington
Burlington
Bedford
Lincoln
Concord
Weston
Wayland
Sudbury
Framingham
Natick
Sherborn
Brookline
Wellesley
Needham
Dedham
Westwood
Dover
Medfield
ZONES
383
384
385-387
388
389-392
393-404
405-409
410-412
413
414-415
416
417
418
419
420-421
422
423
424
425
427
428
429-435
436-441
442-446
TOWN
Millis
Walpole
Norwood
Canton
Milton
Quincy
Weymouth
Braintree
Holbrook
Randolph
Sharon
Cohasset
Norfolk
Hull
Hingham
Rockland
Norwell
Scituate
Marshfield
Pembroke
Hanover
Chelsea
Revere
Winthrop
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